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The Past as Prologue
The Structure of a Quantitative Projection
IN this concluding chapter, we attempt to assay prospects for the future
on the basis of past trends in population, national product, and capi-
tal formation and financing. This is not done in the belief that the
primary justification for establishing and analyzing the record of the
past lies in the power of prediction that such analysis may bestow—if
by prediction one means quantitative estimates of likely future trends.
A prior aim of such knowledge is to enrich current generations with
the experience of their predecessors and, aside from the direct value of
such enrichment of understanding, a vital practical purpose is to con-
tribute to a more intelligent response to current problems. Even if the
emergence of such problems cannot be predicted, once they emerge,
familiarity with analogous situations in the past should lead to more
considered responses than those made in ignorance of the past record
and with a view of each current situation as something new under the
sun. To be sure, there is an element of implicit prediction in recogniz-
ing that a current problem had a counterpart in the past, for such rec-
ognition implies similarities in consequences of alternative responses.
But this is quite different from a quantitative prediction of trends, in
which an explicit forecast, no matter how crude, is made of a specific
situation, and probable prospects and problems are inferred.
I stress this point because, with the development of statistical data
and of quantitative analysis of economic processes, it has become tech-
nically possible to make quantitative projections, extrapolations, and
forecasts. Once a statistical bridge from the past has been constructed
to provide the take-off point, the very ease with which the relatively
simple mathematical operations can be performed tempts the in-
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vestigator to use his analysis as a direct basis for quantitative projec-
tions. Indeed, we considered that approach as a possible use of the em-
pirical findings of this study to gauge future prospects. However, we
did not follow it, and our reasons for. refraining are stated explicitly
below because they may have some relevance to other projections made
in recent years.1
The essence of a projection is the transfer into the future of some
orderly pattern found in the past, with or without modification. The
procedure is essentially the same, whatever the series we work with: the
birth, death, or net immigration rates used in population projections;
the rates of growth of national product per capita, per member of the
labor force, or per manhour used in national product extrapolations;
the proportion of capital. formation to national product, or the capi-
tal stock-output ratios used in capital formation projections; the move-
ments of the shares of various types of capital and of shares of various
industrial users connected with the apportionment of national product
among industries used in projecting components of capital forma-
tion; the shares of external and internal financing and of various
types of the former used in the projection of trends in financing. The
first prerequisite of the procedure is to find some orderly pattern in
the past and its explanation—its association with otherwise known,
relatively invariant, characteristics of nature or man. Without a mod-
icum of orderly pattern in the past, nothing systematic can be extrap-
olated into the future.
•:All this is obvious enough, but it should also be clear from the dis-
•cussion in the preceding chapters that such an orderly pattern, linked
by explanatory hypotheses to• some basic, relatively invariant, char-
acteristics of natural and social processes, cannot be established easily.
In particular, the possibilities of testing the persistence of these patterns
under varying conditions are limited; and in the attempt to support
empirically found patterns by explanatory hypotheses, it is rarely pos-
sible, in the present state of our. knowledge, to assign to such explana-
tory links empirical.coefficientsthat would necessarily produce the
specific trend rates or secular proportions fOund. For lack of adequate
testing and of specific explanation, some major features of the orderly
pattern may be sufficiently in doubt to overshadow any apparently pre-
cise quantitative projections.
1 Some of the general arguments in this Section have been discussed in greater
detail in Simon Kuznets, "Concepts and Assumptions in Long-Term Projections of
National Product," Long-Range Economic Projection (Studies in Income and Wealth,
Vol. 16, Princeton for NBER, 1954); pp. 9—38.
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The argument just advanced can be easily illustrated. Some widely
used current projections begin with the finding that, since 1870 or
1880, gross national product in constant prices per worker grew at the
rate of, say, 2 per cent per year, and was accompanied by a relatively
constant proportion of gross capital formation to gross national product
of, say, somewhat over 20 per cent. This pattern of rate of growth
in per worker product and of a stable gross capital formation pro-
portion is then projected into the future. But in what sense was the
rate of growth in per worker product persistent? We know, from the
analysis in the present study and others, that not only the annual
but also the decadal rate of growth varied; that the movement of the
rate revealed long swings; and that because the adjustment for the
long swings necessitated the use of two-decade or three-decade aver-
ages, the purely statistical persistence of the underlying long-term
rate could hardly be tested by the two or two and a half swings in the
record back to the 1870's. All these statements apply to the gross capi-
tal formation proportion also. Thus there is no statistical basis for
claiming a high degree of invariance or persistence in the specific rate
of growth or in the specific capital formation proportion: the sample
is much too small to permit only a narrow margin of error. Nor is
there an analytical basis that can assure us that persistent factors de-
termined an annual rate of. growth of per worker product of 2 per
cent rather than 2.5 or 1.5 per cent. This is not to argue that analysis
of the past and empirical findings are not useful for quantitative pro-
jections—if there is a compelling reason formaking the projections. It
merely emphasizes that the major point of the findings and of the
analysis in the preceding chapters is to warn against too facile an
extrapolation of past rates, either averaged over a long period or
taken from a relatively brief recent period. For if the long-term move-
ments, even when averaged to cancel the business cycles, are a com-
pound of long swings and of underlying trend lines, the rate of the
trend lines and their retardation must be carefully established, and
the phases of the long swings that would affect the period covered by
the projection must be diagnosed, before a reasonable projection is
possible. Thus, a projection of the long-term movements over the
next twenty-five to thirty years would have to be a compound of pro-
jections of the long swings and of the underlying secular rates. For
the latter, we would have to decide whether the retardation in the
rate of secular growth in per worker product observed in the averages
for the two or two and a half successive long swings should be carried
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into the future. For the long swings, we would have to judge whether
or not the movement since World War II is an upward phase of a long
swing, to be succeeded by a downward phase, and then in turn by an
upward phase—all within the next twenty-five to thirty years.
One obvious implication of these remarks is that the evaluation of
empirical and analytical findings for the purpose of extrapolating them
into the future is in itself a major task. Moreover, conceiving the
extrapolation as a projection of average rates, without close examina-
tion of the variety of experience from which these averages have been
derived, is a crude and possibly dangerous oversimplification. Since
any useful projection involves extrapolating a large number of vari-
ables—population, labor force, national product, capital formation,
industrial structure, foreign trade, basic price relations, and more—
the task of evaluating the findings for the past, of assaying the nature
of the orderly patterns that were found, in close reference to the pur-
poses of the projection that would determine the time scope and char-
acter of some of the basic assumptions involved, becomes formidable
indeed. It is not one that can be undertaken in a short postscript to
this study, which is essentially and primarily concerned with establish-
ing the long-term record of the past, and providing analytical support
for some of the findings.
There is a related consideration in envisaging the task of effective
quantitative projection. Extrapolation from the past into the future
is inevitably based on a double assumption: (1) that the factors that
produced the orderly pattern being extrapolated show no signs of
disappearing; (2) that the other forces, which in the past could have
produced a major change in the orderly pattern and yet did not, were
quite varied and substantial, and that new disturbances in the future
may likewise leave the extrapolated pattern unaffected (or modified
only within specified margins). So far, we have discussed the difficulties
of establishing the orderly pattern and of identifying the factors under
(1). But the assumption under (2) has been only implicit in our dis-
cussion.
Put explicitly, the comment calls for an analysis of the range of con-
ditions under which the orderly pattern was established and presum-
ably persisted. To illustrate: our economy has been growing at x
per cent per decade, when measured in terms of, say, national product
per worker, and let us assume that we know the specific patterns that
persisted over the last eight to nine decades. But during those decades,
extending back to the 1870's, the country was not the battlefield of
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a major war, certainly not of a war employing atomic weapons. This
particular disturbance or condition was not within the range of dis-
turbances or changing conditions under which the economy persisted
in growing at x per cent per decade; nor was there any war or other
disturbance in that period of our past approaching the magnitude of
an atomic holocaust in its possible effects on the economy. For this
obvious reason all existing projections are explicitly conditioned on
the absence of atomic war. If such a stupendous disturbance had
occurred in the decades back to the 1870's, and if, in spite of it, the
x per cent rate of growth per decade in product per worker had been
attained, such a limiting condition would not be stipulated in current
projections.
The case illustrated by the example is a rather simple one—simple,
because we need not examine the decades back to 1870 to be sure that
no disturbance approaching the magnitude of an all-out atomic war
was among the conditions under which the growth pattern of the
economy was attained. But many less obvious and hence more diffi-
cult questions arise. Does the cold war of the last fifteen years, if con-
tinued for the next two to three decades, constitute a condition for
which there is no real analogue within the last eighty or ninety years?
And if so, is it likely to modify beyond recognition any projection from
the past? What about the rate of technological change already in-
fluencing the economy? What about the growing strength of certain
organizational elements in economic life—large business corporations,
large and strong unions, an increasingly larger government sector?
Can we find for all these disturbances and conditions analogues in the
past, which did not prevent the past patterns from emerging, so that
we can say that their persistence into the future is not likely to in-
validate the projection, or at worst will only modify it in ascertainable
directions and magnitudes?
Clearly, a serious quantitative projection involves (in addition to
an evaluation of the precise character of the orderly pattern found in
the past, in reference to the goal and purposes of the projection) a
scrutiny of the variable conditions in the past within which the sys-
tematic patterns were found, in reference to the new conditions and
disturbances that, judging by signs already present, may prevail in the
future. Two consequences follow from this second aspect of the logical
structure of quantitative (and all) projections. First, all projections are
necessarily conditional rather than absolute, in that they are presented
as significant, not under any and all circumstances, but only if some
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disturbances much larger than those in the observable past are ruled
out. These large disturbances or catastrophes removed by declaration
may be not only the rather unlikely ones, such as planetary cataclysms
that would shatter well-established generalizations in the natural
sciences, but also the more probable ones, in the realm of human and
international affairs. Second, it follows that careful attention to im-
pending changes is required—an assessment of events whose shadows
are already upon us. It is indispensable, if the past is to be examined to
see whether conditions and disturbances that did occur and were com-
patible with the orderly pattern found are comparable with those that
are likely in the forecastable future.
This second part of the task of making a considered quantitative
projection only reinforces the comment above—that it cannot be car-
ried through effectively as a mere postscript to astudylike the present
one. The results of the study—both our empirical findings and the
analytical hypotheses—are raw material for many possible quantitative
projections, differing in period of coverage and in emphasis on the
various aspects of the economy. Even if the purpose were defined as
projecting trends in capital formation and financing, the task would
require not only the quantitative projection of population, national
product, and industrial structure, but also a host of assumptions based
upon a large volume of additional data relating to the current changes
foreshadowing future conditions and disturbances. This, then, is a
big and separate task to which the present study, one may hope, makes
a major contribution, but for which—to use technical terminology—the
study is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Conditions for the Future
To paraphrase the preceding comments: The present study provides
a storehouse of findings indispensable for a quantitative projection
into the future; but such a projection also involves a series of choices
and judgments, which, together with evaluation of the current events
that presage the future, is a further and separate step.. Whether such a
step should be taken depends upon the specific, intended uses of the
projection, which would determine its character, and upon a sub-
sequent judgment of the feasibility of the desired prediction on the
basis of the findings of this and other studies.
Such seemingly negative comment is forced upon us by the recog-
nition of the requirements of a considered quantitative projection. Yet
we should be able to advance toward a projection by noting some cur-
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rent events that suggest the future and may constitute the major con-
ditions under which the past patterns, if projected, could be assumed
to operate. In stating these conditions, we will in fact be doing, in a
crude and tentative fashion, what would have to be done in detail for a
considered projection with the use of all available evidence. The
statements that follow, unlike ihe findings buttressed by empirical
evidence and analytical hypotheses in the preceding chapters, are se-
lected broad judgments. Yet they refer to events that are conspicuous
and undeniable.
The selection is guided by two criteria. First, we are concerned with
conditions that have an apparent bearing upon the topic of interest
here—the prospects of demand for and supply of capital. Second, we
have in mind a period extending over the next two and a half to
three decades—to the mid- or late 1980's—and are therefore con-
cerned with presently observable conditions that seem lasting enough
to warrant extrapolation into that longer future. The conditions thus
selected for brief mention are: (1) growth of population; (2) changes in
science and technology; (3) the position of this country in the concert
of nations; (4) the task of governments; (5) savings patterns of the
private sector; (6) changes in financing.
GROWTH OF POPULATION
Increase in population is of obvious bearing upon future trends in
national product and capital formation. More people mean additional
demand for consumer goods and, during the period of formation of
family units, increased demand for residential construction. Addition
to the number of working-age people means a rise in the labor force
ready to man the economic system and waiting to be equipped with
capital. For much of the period we have in mind, the future members
of the new family units and the future entrants into the labor force
are already with us. The infants born today or a year or two ago will,
barring catastrophes of the magnitude that we rule out of considera-
tion, be with us and in their early twenties in the quinquennium from
1981 to 1985. With cataclysms removed by assumption, the quantita-
tively major factor that will affect population numbers over the next
thirty years is the birth rate; and for the consumption and capital de-
manding aspects of population growth, even the birth rate will be of
major importance only toward the end of the period, i.e., in the late
1980's.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)The Past as Prologue
NoTEs TO TABLE 75
SOURCE: Entries for cols. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, lines I to 8 are from Historical Statistics of
the United States, 1789—1945 (1949), and Continuation to 1952, and 1954, Series B-I 3, and
B-83 through B-86. The entries are for the specific census dates; and no adjustment is
made for slight differences in the intercensal intervals in reducing the percentage rates
of change to quinquennial units.
Entries for cols. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, lines 9 to 13, are from Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 123 (October 1955) and No. 160 (August 9, 1957). The projection
used is Series A, based on the assumption that the 1950—1953 fertility rates remain con-
stant throughout the projection period. The population figures are for July 1 of the
given year; and the figures for population under 5 years old are unadjusted for net
census undercount. The absolute change from one date• to the next as shown in the
October 1955 release was assumed to apply to the series excluding armed forces over-
seas shown in the August 9, 1957 release.
Entries for cols. 1, 3, 5, and 7, lines 14 to 16, are derived by applying the estimated
percentage rates of growth shown in parentheses in cola. 2, 4, 6, and 8. The percentage
in col. 8, line 14, is based on a rough relation of the percentages in col. 8 to those in
col. 10 with a lag of five years; that in Co1. 8, line 15, is a rough approximation. The
percentages in col. 6 are based on those in col. 8, with an appropriate lag; the per-
centages in col. 4 are based on those in col. 6, again with an appropriate lag. Finally,
the percentages in col. 2, lines 14 to 16, are assumed to repeat the pattern in the pre-
ceding quinquennia, but not to duplicate the high increase from 1970 to 1975.
jection to 1975 used here, released by the Bureau of the Census in
August 1957, assumes that the birth rates of 1950—1953 will continue
to 1975 and makes rather conservative assumptions about death rates.
Judged by more recent reports, the projection appears to be on the
moderate side. Thus, as of January 1,1958, population excluding
armed forces overseas is set at 171.97 million.2 This leaves only a 4.94
million increase over the two and a half years to mid-1960, if the total
of 176.91 million shown in line 10, column 1is to be attained, com-
pared with a rise of 7.67 million over the two and a half years from
mid-1955 to January 1, 1958. But even as derived on the basis of the
conservative assumptions used in Table 75, prospective population
growth reveals some striking aspects.
If the rates of growth of total population up to 1990 assumed here
are realized, the rise over the three decades, 1960—1990, or 1955—1985,
will be about 54 per cent. This is larger than the rise from 1920 to
1950 or from 1910 to 1940; it is somewhat below that from 1900 to
1930; and is distinctly below that from 1890 to 1920 or from 1880 to
1910.
More relevant in the present connection, and more striking, are the
2 See Current Population Reports, Bureau of the Census, May 14, 1958, Series P-25,
No. 176.
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prospective increases in the group 20 through 29years—the ages when
most people enter the labor force, and form new family units. The
projected rise of this group from 1955 to 1985 is almost 74 per cent,
far higher than that from 1920 to 1950, from 1910 to 1940, from 1900
to 1930, or even from 1890 to 1920. It is exceeded only by the rise
from 1880 to 1910, the decades when unrestricted immigration was
contributing pari4cularly to this working-age group. The projected
rise from 1960 to 1990 is even greater, 91 per cent, and greater than
that for any thirty-year span since 1880. Clearly, we are faced during
the next thirty years with an exceedingly high relative addition to the
age group that makes the largest contribution to new family units and
provides the greatest number of new entrants into the labor force.
The rises in prospect for the population groups aged 10 through 19
and: 5 through 9 are equally striking. These groups, of course, call
particularly upon the services of our educational system. The projected
rise from 1955 to 1985 in the 10 through 19 age group is almost 92
per cent, higher than the rise for any thirty-year period since 1880;
and that for the group aged 5 through 9 is 61 per cent, also well above
any rise during the last three-quarters of the century. With the growth
rates in these groups from 1920 to 1950 and from 1910 to 1940 being
only small fractions of the impending rise, and the trend in age-specific
school attendancerates also likely to rise further, the prospective de-
marid to be made upon an important part of the, country's productive
system will be unprecedented.
Table 75 was prepared and the above comments written in early
1958. The Bureau of the Census has since published a new set of illus-
trative projections of population, taking into account the birth rates
in recent years, which were much higher than expected. These new
projections are utilized in Table 76 and, as in Table 75, it is assumed
that throughout the period of projection the recent birth rates con-
tinue—in this case, the rates prevailing in 1955—1957 (i.e., Series II).
Rather than replace the older estimates in Table 75 by the more re-
cent series, I am showing both, if only to reveal how sharply projections
differ when extrapolations are based on the eperience of different
sets of recent years.
The rates of population growth shown by the new projections only:
reinforce the conclusions already stated. The projected rate of growth
of total population over the next thirty years is higher than that of
any thirty-year period since 1890. Only for l880—1910, when increase'
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Noits TO TABLE 76
For an explanation of the figures in parentheses, see note to lines 7 and 8.
SOURCE: The census data and projections are from M. Zitter and J. S. Siegel,
"Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age and Sex,
1960—1980," Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 187, November 10, 1958. The
projection used is Series II, based on the assumption that fertility will remain constant
at the 1955—1957 level throughout the projection period.
Entries for cols. 1, 3, 5, and 7, lines 7 and 8, are derived by applying the estimated
percentage rates of growth shown in parentheses in cols. 2, 4, 6, and 8. The percentages
in col. 4, lines 7 and 8, are based on the rates in col. 6, a decade earlier. The percentages
in col. 6, lines 7 and 8, are based on the rates in cols. 8 and 10, a decade earlier. The
percentage in col. 8, line 7, is based on the rate in col. 10, a quinquennium earlier. The
percentages in coi. 2, lines 7 and 8, are assumed to repeat the pattern in the preceding
quinquennia, and allow for a trough in the long swing in line 7, twenty years after the
trough in the rate of growth shown in line 3.
the rate higher. The projected rates of population growth in the age
groups 5 through 9, 10 through 19, and 20 through 29 are even more
striking.
Finally, the projected quinquennial rates of change reveal clear
signs of a prospective long swing in the important age groups dis-
tinguished. Thus, the projection indicates a decline from 1955 to 1960
in the 20 through 29 age group, reflecting the declining birth rate of
the 1930's; then the rise resumes, reaching a peak in the quinquennium
of 1965—1970, to be followed by another downward phase. In the
younger age groups there are similar swings, but naturally with earlier
timing. Hence (insofar as the projections are valid), the extraordi-
narily high rate of secular growth in the age groups from 5 through 19
will be accompanied by a marked long swing. Whatever our inference
from these high rates of increase in numbers of school-age youth and
of new family makers and new entrants into the labor force concern-
ing the prospective demand for capital in the next two and a half or
three decades, we must keep in mind that the population projections
suggest long swings that will modify that demand in any one quin-
quennium or decade.
CHANGES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
In these days of atomic energy, man-made satellites, electronic devices,
and other products of burgeoning scientific discovery and technological
change, there is little need to stress their urgent effects on present
trends in economic product and on the demand for capital. Perhaps
less in the focus of public attention is the magnitude of the prospective
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trend in technological change and its possible impact on the demand
for capital.
Our concern here is the potential technological change over the next
twenty-five to thirty years, which may differ from the realized change
if resources, capital, or entrepreneurial ability are not sufficient. By its
nature, the concept of potential technological change is difficult to
define precisely, let alone measure. Yet it is extremely useful, for it
points to the fact that of the large flow of technological change offered,
as it were, to society—even if much of it is not thoroughly tested—only
a part is embodied in the productive structure, mainly because of
limitations of capital and of entrepreneurial ability.
If potential technological change cannot be precisely defined, it may
seem inconsistent to argue that all signs point to an acceleration in the
rate of additions to that potential in the coming decades. Yet such
signs are fairly prominent and should be noted, for they would have
to be evaluated in any considered economic projection.
We begin with the developments in science which, since the late
nineteenth century, have been increasingly the dominant source of
inventions and major technological changes affecting economic pro-
duction and consumption. We are witnessing a high rate of additions
to scientific work and discovery, resulting in general 'from two factors.
The first is the cumulative impact of the natural science disciplines
upon each other, the higher level of attainment in physics giving im-
petus to chemistry, that in chemistry affecting physics, and so on down
the line. There is a similar reciprocal reinforcing effect in the develop-
ment of pure theory and of technical capacity for experimentation.
Advances in experimental method and results, conditioned in part by
the general rise in the productive powers of society, permit tests and
experiments that lead to reconsideration and revision of theory, which
in turn lead to new experiments demanding higher levels of technical
performance. The interdisciplinary character of basic research in the
natural sciences has advanced rapidly in the past few decades, and ad-
vances have been equally rapid in the relation 'between theoretical
work and what might be called experimental and applied technology.
This stimulating interdependence may become increasingly effective
in the decades to come, accelerating the rate of additions to tested
useful knowledge. ' ' S
Second,the number of scientific workers at various levels has in-
creased enormously throughout the world—and in this connection we
must consider the whole world, for science is a transnational complex,
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available (with some exceptions) to all who have the means to apply it.
Even without recourse to figures, we may assume that the number of
qualified workers in the field has increased at an exceptionally high
rate, considering the increasing number of economically advanced
countries that have recognized and emphasized the value of scientific
work.
As the pace of scientific research has quickened, greater emphasis
has been placed upon the translation of scientific discoveries into
practical technological research and application, and a larger flow of
resources has been channeled into that development. Indeed, itis
sometimes not easy to draw the line between discovery and applica-
tion, pure and applied research. This does not mean that the transi-
tion from the scientific discovery to the practical development is easy,
and there are the further steps through the pilot plant to economical
and effective mass production of new goods, and their continual im-
provement. We may reasonably argue that the wider recognition of
the value of research and adaptive activity for economic progress and
performance has led to the allocation of a rapidly increasing volume
of resources to that activity, and that the prospects for the immediate
future indicate a much greater addition to input directed toward it.
Of course, greater input of resources is not necessarily assurance of
greater output of discovery and new technology ready to be absorbed,
on a mass production basis, by the economy's productive system. Yet
it would be surprising if this were not the result. Even if the return
per unit of such input were somewhat lower than in the past, the
huge rise in the input might mean an acceleration in the rate of po-
tential technological change. The impression is particularly strength-
ened if we recognize that we are at the beginning of another revolution
in the supply of industrial power. In the past such revolutions had
far-reaching consequences that radically affected the productive struc-
ture of the economy—consequences that extended over decades. Steam
power, the basis of the modern industrial economy, was introduced
in the 1780's, and it was not until the 1880's that its revolutionary im-
pact on the advanced countries of the world began to subside. The in-
troduction of electric power in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury, followed by the internal combustion engine, resulted in a series
of changes that are still continuing—though at a much slower pace. It
seems certain that the development of nonmilitary applications of nu-
clear physics, of electronics in automation and communications will
have an immense impact upon the productive system. These and ad-
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vances in other fields—rocketry, the biological sciences (promising new
sources of cheap food), solar energy (promising unlimited power), and
many more—may well dominate the economy of the next two or three
decades.
If the rate of additions to potential technological change is likely
to be high in the next three decades, it should give momentum to the
demand for capital funds (as well as for entrepreneurial ability, pri.
vate and public). The demand will be not only for resources needed
for work on the new inventions and products to the point where eco-
nomical mass production becomes feasible. The resources needed will
be far larger when the basic capital equipment required to satisfy
prospective demand is installed, because we can assume that the de-
mand will follow the pattern typical of all successful new products and
processes. In the past, the development of new sources of power and
its uses, alone, brought to our economy prodigious tasks of capital in-
vestment for land transportation—to choose one example. Besides the
investment for procuring, refining, and harnessing the raw materials
for producing power (coal, oil, water), there was the even greater need
of capital to build, equip, and service railroads, electric power plants
and power carrying channels, internal combustion motor vehicles and
the associated networks of roads, bridges, ferries, and tunnels. There
is little reason to assume that the situation will be different, except
possibly in degree, in the future. Any major technological change that
involves the harnessing of new sources of power, the utilizing of a
new complex of natural resources for widespread use, or the creation
of new consumer goods with wide markets demands a large framework
of material capital equipment that can effectively produce the new
power and channel it into useful ends, carry the new sequence of op.
erations with but little input of direct labor, or turn out the new
products effectively and cheaply. With increasing volumes of power
and larger outputs projected, the economies of scale may set the opti-
mum-size unit at quite a high level, and the resulting indivisibility of
initial investment may mean high capital-output ratios for the new
producing units, at least in the early years of operation. Thus, if we
assume a high rate of potential technological change, the first pre-
sumption is of a high rate of demand for capital—unless detailed
investigation produces concrete evidence to qualify or invalidate such
a presumption.
Of course, technological changes have a ramifying influence. They
not only set up new industries and new sectors in the economy, but
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also affect the established ones—in different ways. Some older in-
dustries may be adversely affected if the new technology produces
better and effectively competing substitutes; others may be positively
stimulated if the changes provide an additional market. The new
technology may create demand by some older industries for additional
capital, because a new development may, besides providing the basis
for an entirely new industry, also serve as a useful addition to the
capital equipment of an old industry. New technology may reduce the
demand by other established industries for capital, if increases in ef-
ficiency outrun the possible rise in the market for the products. Any
considered analysis of these effects must specify the likely new tech-
nological changes, and then infer their possible effects on the estab-
lished sectors of the industrial system. All one can say here is that in
the past the net effect of new technological changes has been to in-
crease both total output and demand for capital for the economy as a
whole, and the greater the rate of technological change, the greater
the rise in output and in net demand for capital. While the statement
can be nothing more than crude conjecture, it is most reasonable to
assume that a projected high rate of potential technological change
means a high projected rate of demand for capital—net of any con-
tractions on the part of industries competitively and adversely affected
by the new technology.
All this has obvious bearing upon the capital-output ratios. We
have already commented upon the variability of those ratios even over
long periods, and the difficulty of agreeing upon purely statistical pro-
jections into the future to derive amounts of capital formation pre-
sumably required by any given projected basket of final goods. But
past records do suggest that revolutionary changes in power production
result in rises in capital-output ratios, first, because of their high level
in the power and closely related industries themselves, and then be-
cause of the effect of the extension of the use of power to other in-
dustries (manufacturing and agriculture, for example). If the next two
or three decades witness a power revolution, itis not unlikely that
there will be consequent pressures for raising the capital-output ratios,
and these pressures can be responded to without a slowing down in
the rate of growth of final output only if the additional savings are
forthcoming. It should be emphasized that the capital-output ratios
can be raised by a slower growth of output, the denominator of the
fraction. If the newly emerging power industries, with their high de-
mands for capital per unit of product (at least in the initial stages),
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claim a large part of the limited volume of nationwide capital forma-
tion, the rise in the capital-output ratio must be accompanied by a
slowing down in the rate of growth of final output (i.e., of national
product).
POSITION OF THIS COUNTRY IN THE CONCERT OF NATIONS
In dealing with prospects for the future in the position of this country
among other nations, we face a realm of human affairs in which changes
seem to have been fast, furious, and unpredictable. It would be a
hardy prognosticator indeed who, looking back three decades (to the
late 1920's), could assure himself that a fairly thorough and even
highly imaginative study of the situation then would have enabled
him to foresee the shifts on the international scene that have taken
place. He would have had to project the emergence and collapse of
Nazi Germany; the scope and impact of the Second World War;
the broad consequences of the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union; the
collapse of the overseas empires of Western Europe; the formation of
more than twenty new independent national states; the spread of
Communism to mainland China; the extension of Soviet power to
Eastern and part of Central Europe; and so on, through a long list of
changes, some only now in the making. With such a retrospective
look, one may well ask whether there is any sense in attempting a
projection in this field of low visibility.
Yet, unless we make reasonably realistic assumptions concerning
prospects in international relations, everything else, grounded upon
consideration of domestic factors alone, will be left hanging in the
air. For clearly, problems arising in the relations between this coun-
try and others are likely to dominate the scene for decades to come.
If we exclude the contingency of a major world war, it should be
possible at least to secure guidance for thought by considering the
general trends on the international scene and their probable impact
on this country's economy, viewing these trends, both current and
prospective, against a broader historical perspective.
That perspective can best be suggested if we look at the modern
historical process as one dominated by the spread of the industrial
system in a world of sovereign—legally independent—national units,
with widely differing natural and historical heritages. The industrial
system is a complex of economic and social processes based on the
increasing use of technology provided by modern science, and after its
birth at the end of the eighteenth century in Great Britain it spread
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to other European countries (western, central, and northern), to the
North American continent, to some other offshoots of Western Europe
across the seas, to Japan, and most recently to Russia, an eastern off-
shoot of European civilization. The efforts to introduce it into China,
India, and other underdeveloped countries dominate the current scene.
The spread of this system, in turn a changing complex reflecting prog-
ress in modern technology, and the parallel, if not necessarily simul-
taneous, spread of the ideas of national independence and national at-
tainments to much of the world would go far to explain the shifts in in-
ternational relations that have occurred since the early nineteenth
century.
The mechanism of the spread, and the relations among the national
units involved in it—peaceful flows of goods, men, and capital, or the
more warlike types of contact ranging from pressure to outright con-
flict, or imitation and reaction—already subjects of a vast literature,
could be dealt with in detail. But for our purpose, two general features
of this process of spread deserve mention.
The first is the inevitable transitoriness of economic leadership. No
single nation can retain economic leadership indefinitely, for the sim-
ple reason that if industrialization begins in country X—giving it the
advantage of leadership—and then spreads to country Y, the shift to Y
means a loss of relative (if not absolute) advantage for X. Thus, if the
industrial system spreads at all—if industrialization occurs not only in
the pioneer state (Great Britain), but also in follower states (United.
States, Germany, and so on)—its inception in the latter with the higher
rates of growth that the newly industrialized nations attain means,
ipso facto, reduction in the relative superiority of the pioneer state.
This conclusion is particularly clear in terms of percentage rates of
growth. The quickening of those rates in modern times is part and
parcel of the shift from the pre-industrial to the industrial pattern of
economic performance, and no country can maintain such quickening
for any length of time, relative to other countries that may join in the
spread of the industrial system at later dates.
The second general feature to be noted is the increasing diversity
of social structure into which the industrial system is fitted, as it
spreads from the country of origin to other parts of the world. The
system is most likely to spread first to countries whose historical
heritage is closest to that of the pioneer country, for this similarity of
heritage is likely to make for closer ties and for greater ease in adopt-
ing the socially conditioned new ways. Even so, the very fact that the
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next group of countries are followers will mean that the industrial
system is set up within a modified policy and social framework. It is
hardly an accident that the United States and Germany were the
originators of the protective tariff system and developed corporate
structures and economic organizations somewhat different from those
in Great Britain. As the system spreads further, it is adopted by coun-
tries with a historical background and social structure quite different
from those of the pioneer and immediate follower nations. In this
sense both Japan and particularly the Soviet Union are, at present,
at the end of the line that stretches back to Great Britain; and if
China and India manage industrialization, the accompanying social
and political structures, in both their internal and external aspects,
may be quite different from anything observed so far.
These broad generalizations are advanced because they seem to ii-
luminate much of the recent historical past, and explain the increased
international tensions—a compound result of the increasing number
of large advanced economies and of the greater divergence in their
social and political structures. They also may be useful as a background
against which to interpret the obvious changes in the international
position of the United States, and to consider the prospective demands
upon our economy that these changes and their probable continuation
into the future are likely to make.
Of the inferences that can be drawn from the recent trends, viewed
against the wider background just suggested, three seem particularly
relevant here. First, there is little evidence that the increased inter-
national tension, with an apparent division of the world into three
camps, two of which are contending for the allegiance of the third,
will subside in the foreseeable future. No such relaxation has been
observed since World War II or, for that matter, since the 1930's. The
forces that generate the tension—the contrast between growth in power
and failure of commensurate growth in human welfare within the
authoritarian countries, and the gap between aspirations and achieve-
ments in the underdeveloped countries of the world—show no signs
of abatement. Indeed, a sober and critical estimate of probabilities sug-
gests that the strains are increasing, and that the free part of the world
for which this country at present bears the responsibility of leadership
may suffer further disturbing losses and shifts in power.
Second, the emergence of this country as a leader has meant con-
tinuing claims upon our economy: in the form of outlay for security
purposes (much of which in the past was, in a sense, carried for us by
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other countries then in a leading position); unilateral transfers in the
form of economic or military aid; or capital flows abroad under public
or private auspices. Given the political structure of the world, no de-
veloped country can escape such claims, unless it disregards its security
altogether or places the responsibility for it on other shoulders. Since
neither alternative is open to a major power like the United States, it
is only realistic to assume that such claims will continue and may be-
come a larger proportion of the nation's total product, a point to which
we shall return in discussing the prospective role of governments. Of
course, there is still another alternative—sacrificing part of the inde-
pendence of sovereignty by closer union with other countries having
similar external problems. While one hesitates to consider this pos-
sibility in the present discussion, a more imaginative view of the longer-
term implications of this country's position in the world might place
heavy emphasis upon it.
Third, the purely economic claims and flows originating in inter-
national relations are likely to remain a moderate part of the total
nonconsumption claims upon the country's national product. Free
movement of private capital investment abroad is not likely to rise
relative to governmental loans, grants in aid, military assistance, and
especially security expenditures. This is partly a result of political ten-
sions in many capital-hungry countries. Those tensions accompany the
continuous search for a social and political organization that can re-
solve the gap between aspirations and attainments without imposing
authoritarianism. It is partly a result of the political cleavages among
the more advanced countries of the world. It also results from current
technological changes, which exact such pressures on our domestic
markets for private capital funds that little is left to flow abroad ex-
cept to finance indispensable raw material supplies and branch plants.
THE TASK OF GOVERNMENTS
The secular rise in the share of the government sector in national
product and in capital formation has been widely discussed. The two
questions suggested in the present connection are, first, whether that
rise is likely to continue over the next two or three decades; and second,
if it does continue, how it will affect the prospective demand for or
supply of capital.
The first question is partially answered by the comments just made.
Insofar as government activities are affected by the country's inter-
national position, the continuation or even rise of the high share of
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the government sector in the economy is likely. A full answer would
depend upon a careful weighing of the many pressures for larger gov-
ernment expenditures on goods—whether at federal or state and local
levels—relative to the expected growth of the total national product
upon which such government expenditures draw.
The experience of the post-World War II decade and some current
projections of government expenditures suggest that the prospect may
be for a continuing high share of claims by governments upon the
country's gross national product. If we take the latter for the recent
decade, from 1948 through 1957, excluding the first two postwar years,
and calculate the percentage growth of the product (in 1957 prices)
from the first quinquennium (1948—1952) to the second (1953—1957),
the rate per year is 3.8 per cent. This is somewhat lower than the rate
of 4.4 per cent for the post-World War I decade of 1920 through 1929,
although that rate may be somewhat exaggerated by a different mix-
ture of business cycle phases.3 As a measure of the draft that the gov.
ernments made upon the gross national product for purposes of con-
sumption, we take government purchases of commodities and serv-
ices, excluding nonmilitary public construction because the latter rep-
resents capital formation. If, then, we calculate the annual percentage
share of the draft by governments for consumption, so defined, in
gross national product, the arithmetic mean of the shares is 15.1 per
cent for 1948—1952 and 17.9 per cent for 1953—1957, which can be
compared with 5.7 per cent for 1929. The significant point is that
although the second of the two quinquennia was dominated by an
economy-minded administration in Washington, and although the
share of federal expenditures in national product did decline after
3 The 1948—l957 totals are from the Economic Report of the President, January
1958, Table F-2, p. 118; those for 1020—1929 are Variant III, from the present report,
Table R-2.
Inclusion of 1058 only reduces the rate of growth in the post-World War II period.
Gross national product (in 1958 p1-ices) grew from 1949—1953 to 1954—1958 at the
rate of 3.2 per cent per year (see Economic Report of the President, January 1959,
Table D-2. p. 140).
4 A further deduction should be made for producers' equipment (nonmilitary)
purchased by governments; but no data are available for these years. The item,
however, is small relative to the totals involved.
5 The calculationis based on totals in current prices, but it would not be
significantly different for those in constant prices. For the underlying data, see
Economic Report of the President, January 1958, Tables F-i, p. 117; and F-32, p. 152.
For 1958 the share of the draft by governments for consumption was 17.7 per cent,
slightly higher than the 17.3 per cent for 1953—1957 based on comparable data (see
Economic Report of the President, January 1959, Table D-l, p. 139, and Table D-32,
p. 176.
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1953, the rise in the share of state and local expenditures offset that
decline; and even in 1957 the share of total government purchases for
consumption was three times as high as in 1929. Thus, over the 1948—
1957 decade, the relative burden of claims for government consump-
tion continued to be high and even rose somewhat.
That continued high levels of the share of national product claimed
by government consumption may prevail in the future is suggested in
the recent projection by a panel of the Special Studies Project (in
Report IV) of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.6 That projection ex-
tends to 1967 only, and presents a range of government expenditures
from low to high. Even the low projected increase in government pur-
chases of goods (in 1957 dollars) is from $86 billion in 1957 to $127
billion in 1967, or at the rate of 4 per cent per year. (If we use the
high projection of gross national product, and assume the same ratio
of government purchases of goods and services to gross national prod-
uct as in the low projection, the rise is from $86 billion in 1957 to
about $141 billion in 1967, or at the rate of over 5 per cent per year.)
This 4 per cent rate is somewhat higher than the rate of growth of
gross national product observed from 1948—1952 to 1953—1957; and if
the latter rate persists, the share of government expenditures in gross
national product will rise. To be sure, the projection allows for a
rise in the share of capital formation within total government purchases
of commodities and services; but, on the other hand, the low range
projection here is compared with a rate of growth of national product
that may well be above the long-term secular level.
It is not unrealistic to assume that the draft by the government sec-
tor for current consumption, and not for the purpose of providing
capital for the needs already mentioned in discussing population
growth and technological change, may remain at the current high
levels of its share in gross national product—and may even rise some-
what. This draft, together with private consumption, constitutes a de-
duction to be made from national product to derive capital formation
as a residual, and it thus constitutes also a draft upon the savings of
the nation. Hence, a continued high proportional level of government
purchases of goods and services for current consumption means, other
conditions being equal, that much lower a share for savings and capital
formation.
For the problems of savings and capital formation, the high share
6 The Challenge to America: Its Economic and Social Aspects (Rockefeller Brothers
Fund, Inc., 1958), p. 71.
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of governments in national product and the wider role that govern-
ments have been forced to play in the economy and society of recent
decades have other implications. Indeed, the mere quantitative weight
of the government sector may be less important than the mechanism
by which governments secure their share, and the complex of relations
among economic groups in the community which the governments may
be affecting, often by design, in the process. For example, given one
and the same percentage share of government consumption in national
product, covering it by proceeds of progressive taxes may have effects
on saving and investment in the private sector vastly different from
the effects of covering it by sales taxes or deficit financing. The quantita-
tive rise in government activities relative to the rest of the economy,
moreover, increases the weight of effects of government policies in se-
curing their share, and carrying through redistributive transfers in the
process. Finally, governments can perform additional and important
economic functions and, in recent decades, have been pressed into per.
forming them.
The wide field for review thus opened can hardly be surveyed here.
But for the problem at hand it is essential to note that, within recent
decades, the governments of this country have assumed major re-
sponsibility for full employment and economic stability—to an ex-
tent unknown in the past; that the increased volume of government
expenditures, which involved a rising ratio of taxes to national prod-
uct, was accompanied by an increasing weight of progressive taxes in
the total tax structure; and that the responsibility for full employ-
ment, coupled with a pressure for larger government expenditures,
for higher consumption levels, and for increased private capital forma-
tion, was associated with a marked inflationary trend in the economy.
These changes since the mid-1930's are so conspicuous and well known
that they hardly need documentation, and their effect on the consump-
tion and savings patterns of the private sector will be touched upon
below. But it may be relevant to observe here, while we are discussing
the share and role of governments, that the changes just noted are
neither accidental nor capricious assumption by governments of addi-
tional responsibilities in the economic sphere, nor can their assumption
be viewed as results of ignorance or of narrow interests. On the con-
trary, the assumption of these additional responsibilities, as well as
the broad way in which policy has been shaped, are rooted in powerful
underlying factors. The acceptance of responsibility for full employ-
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ment has been forced by the recognition that government action can
and hence must minimize the failure to use resources fully, which the
unassisted operation of the private sector can bring about. The in-
creased progressivity of the tax burden and the generally egalitarian
trends in our government policy reflect a changed social view of the
value of high incomes and large personal savings. They reflect also
a different view of the equity of leaving low income groups at a rela-
tively low level in the scale in times when future economic advance-
ment for them may be threatened by external dangers. Clearly, the
growing needs of governments for current consumption and capital
formation, combined with the aspirations of households for higher
levels of living and the needs of the business sector for more capital
goods, are likely to generate inflationary trends—if none of the claimant
groups can be forced into a position where a shrinking market will
lead to a reduction in prices. The burden of the adjustment in these
conditions is then carried by those who lose in the attempt to keep their
monetary gains commensurate with the real gains in the economy. All
these comments are relevant because they indicate that the forces be-
hind recent changes in the role of governments are fairly deep seated.
In considering their implications for the savings patterns of the private
sector, therefore, we cannot assume that the higher share and the
greater role of governments will not continue, at least in the fore-
seeable future.
SAVINGS PA1ERNS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The preceding comments suggest that, because of a larger growth
of population in certain strategic age groups, an accelerated rate of
potential technological change, and continued pressure upon the econ-
omy resulting from international tensions, the prospective demand for
capital and the demand by the government sector for current con-
sumption are likely to be large. Whether the continued demand for
both will claim a rising proportion of the total projected product is a
question that cannot be answered here with assurance. Its considered
exploration calls for a detailed analysis of the factors and conditions
only briefly noted above. Whatever the probable answer, the demand
for capital proportionate to output is not likely to drop, and we may
now ask whether the savings patterns in the private sector suggest sav-
ings proportions that will match the prospective demand for capital.
We are concerned with the private sector alone because, as already in-
dicated, the government sector is not likely to have net savings in the
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long-term prospect. Indeed, it may be forced to draw upon savings in
the private sector.
Much of the discussion in the preceding chapters is applicable here,
and three major trends may be stressed. First, the net savings propor-
tion in net national product has, on the whole, declined. This move-
ment is not incompatible with the constant proportion of personal
savings to disposable income of individuals and households, because
the proportion of disposable income to national product has declined
with the rise in the share of direct taxes. Second, capital consumption
charges have increased as a proportion of both net and gross national
product, contributing to the relative long-term constancy in the gross
savings proportion to gross national product. Third, the share of the
government sector in gross savings has declined since the 1930's; the
share of the corporate sector must have increased in the long run;
and the share of individuals and households must have declined. The
share of gross private savings in gross private product may have been
constant in the long run; but the contribution of corporations must
have increased, while that of individuals and households declined (even
if the proportion of personal savings to disposable income—both nu-
merator and denominator net or gross of depreciation on individually
owned residential housing—is assumed to have remained constant). All
these trends are particularly pronounced in the long run since 1870,
and for totals in constant prices; they must be qualified for shorter
periods, and for totals in current prices, when prices rise significantly.
But the trends are sufficiently grounded in long-established patterns of
consumer behavior and in factors affecting the structure of capital
formation to warrant attention in thinking of the future.
Concerning the savings of individuals and households, we would be
inclined to argue that, at best, their ratio to disposable income will
remain at the moderate levels that have prevailed in recent years; and
that, if the ratio of disposable income to gross private product declines,
the ratio of personal savings, even including depreciation on individ-
ually owned residential housing, may decline. This prospect is quite
compatible with a substantial rise in real income per capita. To use
some recent data: per capita disposable income, in 1958 prices, rose
from an average of $1,225 for 1939—1941toan average of $1,688 for
1948—1957, or 38 per cent in slightly more than twelve years.7 But the
ratio of personal savings to disposable income averaged 7.2 per cent in
1939—1941 and 6.8 per cent in 1948—1957 (Table 77). To be sure, the
7 See Economic Report of the President, January 1959, Table D-14, p. 155.
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TABLE 77
STRUCTURE OF GROSS SAVINGS IN RELATION TO GROSS PRODUCT,











1. Total savings to GNP 16.0 12.9 15.6 14.8 15.2 12.6
2. Government surplus (+) or deficit (—)to
GNP 1.0—2.0 1.1—0.2 0.5—2.3
3. Gross private savings to GNP 15.0 14.9 14.5 15.0 14.8 14.9
4. GPP to GNP 95.9 92.1 92.3 91.3 91.8 90.6
5. Gross private savings to GPP 15.7 16.2 15.7 16.5 16.1 16.4
6. Corporate profits before taxes to GPP 10.1 9.7 12.7 11.0 11.8 9.2
7. Taxes to corporate profits before taxes 13.9 35.9 46.8 51.9 49.4 51.1
8. Corporate profits after taxes to GPP 8.7 5.9 6.8 5.3 6.0 4.5
9. Dividends to corporate profits after taxes 66.7 72.4 46.2 57.1 51.6 69.5
10. Undistributed corporate profits to GPP 2.9 1.7 3.7 2.3 3.0 1.4
ii. Capital consumption charges to GPP 8.6 8.6 7.1 8.8 8.0 10.0
12. Gross business profits before taxes to GPP 18.7 18.3 19.9 19.8 19.8 19.2
13. Gross business savings to GPP, lines 10 + 1111.5 10.3 10.8 11.1 10.9 11.4
14. Personal income to GPP 85.7 84.9 86.5 86.4 86.4 89.3
15. Personal taxes to personal income 3.0 3.3 10.4 11.9 11.2 12.2
16. Disposable income to GPP 83.0 82.1 77.5 76.2 76.8 78.5
17. Personal savings to disposable income 5.1 7.2 6.4 7.1 6.8 6.4
18. Personal savings to GPP 4.2 5.8 5.0 5.4 5.2 5.0
19. Gross private savings to GPP, lines 13 + 18,
or line 5 15.7 16.2 15.7 16.5 16.1 16.4
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
All entries are arithmetic means of percentages calculated separately for each year.
GNP =grossnational product; GPP =grossprivate product.
SOURCE: See Economic Report of the President, January 1959, Appendix Tables D-l,
D-3, D-9, D-10, D-13, D-16, and D-56.
Total savings, defined in accordance with the Department of Commerce practice,
include gross private domestic investment plus net exports of goods and services.
Personal savings are net.
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latter was higher than the 5.1 per cent ratio for 1929, but 1929 was in
many ways an exceptional year; and the Department of Commerce per-
sonal savings estimates for that year may be too low.8 The ratio of
personal savings to personal income was 4.9 per cent in 1929, 6.8 per
cent in 1939—1941, 6.0 per cent in 1948—1957, and 5.6 per cent in 1958
(see Table 77).
Several reasons can be adduced for expecting rather low ratios of
personal savings to personal and disposable income in the future. First,
this country's economy is geared to rising consumption, and our in-
stitutions and patterns of social behavior encourage higher consump-
tion per capita. It is unrealistic to assume that these well-established
institutions and patterns will be radically changed in the foreseeable
future: they have become more rather than less effective in recent
decades. Second, technological change at high levels will have an im-
pact on consumer wants just as it will on the demand for capital goods.
Third, full employment policy, progressive taxation and, to some ex-
tent, rising prices have made for a less unequal distribution of dis-
posable income, which—other conditions remaining the same—con-
tributes to a lower rate of personal savings; and these conditions are
likely to prevail in the future. Finally, and perhaps most important of
all: if international tensions persist and there is a continued sense of
insecurity about the future—not about the economic future (which
might make for greater savings propensities) but about life in general
in the face of external dangers—the climate will not be favorable for
more than a limited accumulation of savings. For savings are essentially
a stake in the economic future, and such stakes become less important
when noneconomic factors make the future uncertain.
As to the contribution of corporations to the savings of the private
sector, the data in Table 77 suggest the limits that may be expected.
The decade 1948—1957 was one of strong demand for capital, high
levels of demand for consumer goods, and relatively high profits in
private business. Yet gross business savings, i.e., undistributed profits
plus capital consumption charges, averaged 10.9 per cent of gross pri-
vate product, somewhat less than in 1929 and somewhat more than in
8 Goldsmith's estimates, for a comparable concept,i.e.,excluding consumers'
durable goods, yield a much higher ratio of savings to disposable income for 1929
(and other years). Furthermore, the personal savings figures used here and in
Table 77 are net, while for our purposes they should be gross of depreciation on
residential housing owned by individuals (with a corresponding addition to personal
and disposable income), and net of depreciation on housing owned by corporations.
Unfortunately, no such annual estimates are readily available.
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1939—1941—the latter being years of substantial unemployment and
slack in the economy. These savings were not proportionately low be-
cause of high dividend disbursements relative to corporate profits after
taxes: the percentage of 51.6 in 1948—1957 was lower than that in either
1929 or 1939—1941. Savings were limited partly because capital con-
sumption charges based on original cost were, particularly during
1948—1952, on the low side; and partly because, although corporate
profits before taxes in 1948—1957 were somewhat higher relative to
gross private product than in 1929 and in 1939—1941, they were, after
taxes, distinctly below the 1929 relative level and about the same as
that in 1939—1941.
Thus, there was no perceptible rise in the ratio of gross business sav-
ings to gross private product in a decade of strong demand for capital
funds, compared with earlier periods in which the demand was not
strong; nor was there much of a rise in the personal savings proportion
to gross private product. As a result, the ratio of total gross private
savings to gross private product in 1948—1957 was only slightly higher
than that in 1929 (although an upward correction of the personal
savings estimate for 1929 might mean a decline from that year), and
was about equal to that in 1939—1941. We cannot conclude from
this comparison that gross private savings generated were not suf-
ficient, and that the recent inflationary trends were in fact the con-
sequence of insufficient savings. For, as repeatedly indicated in the
earlier chapters, we cannot infer imbalances between exantesupply of
and demand for savings from ex post facto measures of savings and
capital formation proportions. But the evidence certainly is consistent
with the view that during the 1948—1957 decade a combination of
high-level demand for consumer goods and continued high levels of
government drafts for current consumption might have kept private
savings and capital formation below the proportion required to in-
crease productivity sufficiently to offset inflationary pressures. Un-
less in the next few years the private sector can generate savings and
capital formation in a greater proportion to a rising private product,
the pressure of the demand for goods upon the supply of savings will
persist.
CHANGES IN FINANCING
In the discussion so far no attention has been directed toward trends
in financing. But some conjectures concerning likely trends in financing
can be inferred from the comments above. In brief, they amount to a
continuation of the trends discussed in Chapters 5 and 6: a moderate
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rise in the share of internal financing in the business sector; a con-
tinued high level and perhaps further rise in the share of external
financing in the residential real estate sector; and continuance of
external financing in the government sector. And there are no grounds
for assuming that, in the channeling of external funds, the share of
financial intermediaries, particularly those in the insurance sector, will
not continue to rise—given continuance of the trend toward greater
equality in the size-distribution of disposable income and a larger
proportion of personal savings arising in the lower income groups.
These inferences hardly touch upon the major problems in the area
of credit and financing, in response to which changes may occur in
financial institutions and in policies bearing upon prospective trends.
The preceding discussion has indicated the vastly increased importance
of governments and of business corporations in total gross financing.
Of total gross savings in Table 77(understatedbecause they exclude
capital formation by governments via public construction), corporate
retention plus government surplus or deficit accounts for more than
two-thirds. Furthermore, savings of individuals have been increasingly
channeled through financial intermediaries. In other words, the whole
process of decision concerning the placement of savings has become in-
creasingly depersonalized: it is either in the hands of financial inter-
mediaries, or of business corporations via gross retention, or directly
subject to action by governments.
The problem arises how the process of decision is affected by the tra-
ditionally conceived instruments of the financial markets via the inter-
est rates, or of the banking system, or of the central bank. There is little
question that, despite the rapid adjustment of financial institutions to
changing conditions—or perhaps because of such rapid adjustment—
there is an acute need to reassess the operation of the financial system,
and reconsider the roles of its instruments of adaptation to the chang-
ing patterns of savings in the economy. How do interest rates affect
saving by individuals or other units, and channel the available sav-
ings into capital uses with different periods of pay-off? How does the
growth of financial intermediaries, other than commercial banks,
affect the relation between central bank policies and the financial
stability and growth of a country? How does the large proportion of
total savings originating in gross retention by corporations affect the
supply of funds to alternative uses? How much of gross retention be.
comes available for investment in new channels, not set by the corpora-
tion's own past experience in a given field? All these questions are
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clearly made more acute by the large price rises since World War II,
with their distorting effects on the comparative economic returns to
various groups of the population, and on the supply of productive
factors to what are, from the standpoint of society, the more important
uses.
Recognition of all these problems will not, of course, tell us much
about likely trends in the structure of financing. The broad movements
in those trends will be laid down by major technological changes,
government drafts, and the persisting patterns of individual and corpo-
rate savings. But given the problems and earnest groping toward their
solution, some changes should result both in measures intended to
regulate and shape the behavior of financial institutions and in the
policies pursued by them (also perhaps even in the identity of the
institutions). These changes may well affect the trends in the distribu-
tion of external financing among types of financial intermediaries and
among groups of capital users, the differential prices of various types
of external financing, and the distribution of the latter among various
types of loan instruments.
Concluding Comments
The above treatment of conditions for the future, far too brief and
dogmatic, may carry a sense of firmer conviction than is intended. The
discussion reflects conclusions suggested by the record of this coun-
try's economy—an economy geared for a long-run rise to increasingly
high levels of consumption per capita, and one in which savings and
capital formation, though large and sustained, nevertheless have been
kept within moderate proportional limits by the secularly high pro-
pensity to consume. It is also an economy in which the recently in-
creasing diversion of product to current consumption by governments,
combined with high levels of consumer demand, has limited capital
formation and savings proportions and brought about, under condi.
tions of full employment, rising price levels which have persisted even
through the 1958 recession. Against this background, consideration of
the prospective large rise in population numbers—particularly of new
family makers, entrants into the labor force, and of the school.age
groups—the prospective acceleration of potential technological change
and the prospect of continued international competition and strain
suggest the following prospects. First, the demand for capital over the
coming two and a half to three decades is likely to be large. Second,
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drains upon the national product for current consumption by govern-
ments will continue to beproportionately sizable and may well rise.
Third, high levels of consumption and the high secular propensity to
consume by individuals and households are likely to continue. Fourth,
under the circumstances, the supply of voluntary savings may not be
adequate. Finally, inflationary pressures may well continue, with the
result that part of the savings needed for capital formation and gov-
ernment consumption will be extracted through this particular mech-
anism. Yet, extrapolation of inflationary pressures over the next thirty
years raises a specter of intolerable consequences, making the policy
solutions adopted critically important; and those solutions, in turn,
will affect the Structure and pattern of financial intermediaries and
their role in financing.
In addition to this broad set of prospects for the twenty-five, to
thirty-year period as a whole, we should note probable modifications
that may be part of the long swings. There are clear signs of long
swings in the time pattern of the rates of population growth. We may
now be in a downward phase of the long swing, reflecting the currently
low rate of family formation and additions to the labor force resulting
from the low birth rates of the 1930's. But there may be factors other
than demographic. The international political situation is subject to
swings and perturbations of its own—and these cannot but affect our
country's economy. There are also swings in the pendulum of political
leadership at home.
In ending the discussion we must repeat that the prospects just sum-
marized are judgments, and we may well have given too much weight
to current events and problems, and too little to the uncertainties of
the long.term future. Above all, a major condition for the future is the
international situation, which in these days affects even such seemingly
domestic factors as the rate of potential technological change made
possible by scientific discovery, and the population's propensity to
consume and to save. But prognostication of international relations
requires far more knowledge of what is happening abroad, or is likely
to happen, than I can claim. In particular, little in the present study
contributes to our knowledge of trends in the authoritarian economies,
or of their stages of development, or of their possible effects on the
position and tasks of this country's economy within the next two or
three decades. There may well be shifts, particularly within the Soviet
Union, that might lead to relaxation of international competition and
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tension—although it is difficult for a casual observer to discern and
evaluate them.
These qualifications, and many others that could be cited, are real.
But they should not lead to a denial of the value of orderly speculation
on the prospects for the future. The problems suggested are grave
enough to warrant much greater attention to the longer-term view
than seems to be given it in current projections, and to justify the
testing and refining of these speculations in the more considered and
careful projection suggested as the next step to which this and other
studies can contribute the indispensable materials. Indeed, the one
major justification of such hazardous intellectual operations lies in
the possibility that they may reveal the magnitude of the problems
and generate policies that might limit their impact, if not forestall
them altogether. All historical trends—past or prospective—are con-
tingencies, rather than paths that society took or must follow inex-
orably. Nothing that has happened was inevitable, and nothing in
the present outlook is inevitable. But the contingencies must be clearly
seen if they are to be acted upon wisely, and a considered long-term
projection could not but help us see the paths and choices before us.
This additional, if still uncertain, knowledge may lead to a more in-
telligent response to the challenging prospects for the future.
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